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Abstract
The fight for space between city administrators and street vendors working in city
centers is one of the major controversies about street commerce. Trying to renew and
upgrade their downtowns, city administrators of most urban areas have attempted to
relocate street vendors from central areas to peripheries, from the streets to indoor public
markets. That attempt has almost always found fierce opposition among street vendors,
who claim that entering into contact with the greatest number of pedestrians is the key to
successful street vending. Most scholars studying street vendors have not questioned such
a proposition; on the contrary, they have somehow taken it for granted.
Yet, a comparison of four street vendor groups -- two located in the most accessible
areas and two in less accessible areas of downtown Mexico City - revels that street
vendors with a more limited access to customers can obtained better working conditions
and economic results than others who are located in most accessible areas. The following
factors explain the better results of the street vendors located in the less accessible areas of
downtown Mexico City. First, street vendors located in the less accessible areas have
easier access to storage space, more room for large stalls and are less likely to have their
goods confiscated by the police. These advantages provide them the possibility to increase
the scale of their commerce. Second, the possibility to increase the scale of their commerce
and their limited competition for space function as an incentive to expand their network of
suppliers to low-cost intermediaries -- in this specific case with intermediaries involved in
smuggling -- and to develop street vendor organizations that support their product
specialization. Having very low prices and working in specialized street markets, the street
vendors located in the less accessible areas of downtown Mexico City attract customers
despite their location.
In contrast, the street vendors located in the most accessible areas because of their
small-scale type of commerce and because they are located in areas where street vending is
officially banned but unofficially tolerated they got involved in a competition for space
that constrains their profits and lead the street vendors to augment their number to gain
political baking. If the city government will not support street vendors located in the most
accessible areas -- in particular, if it will not act to regulate competition for space of these
street vendor groups -- street trading of smuggled products will remain the best alternative
for Mexico City street vendors.
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1. Introduction
The fight for space between city administrators and street vendors working in city
centers is one of the major controversies about street commerce. Trying to renew and
upgrade their downtowns, city administrators of most urban areas have attempted to
relocate street vendors from central areas to peripheries, from the streets to indoor public
markets. That attempt has almost always found fierce opposition among street vendors,
who claim that relocation translates to a loss of a consistent portion of their already-meager
incomes. Working in the most central streets is a guarantee of entering into contact with
the greatest number of pedestrians and that is, they argue, the key to successful street
vending. Most scholars studying street vendors have not questioned such a proposition; on
the contrary, they have somehow taken it for granted. So, describing street vendors
working in downtown Mexico City, Cross (1996) writes that, after being relocated to
publicly built commercial plazas, street vendors returned to the streets because their profits
had diminished (Cross, 19996). Other studies have focused on estimating the economic
loss street vendors incur when relocated (Donovan, 2002). You can imagine my surprise
when doing field research for my thesis, I noticed that in the less accessible areas of
downtown Mexico City, there were street vendor groups who appeared to do better than
their colleagues working in the most accessible area of the city center (see Figures 1 and
2).
Street vendors in the most accessible areas of the city center, the neighborhoods
located in the central and southern part of downtown Mexico City, sell middle-income
pedestrians every kind of low-value product which, they told me later, they buy in the less
accessible street markets of the city center. They have very small stalls and limited access
to storage space, which limits the variety of their products and, therefore, their sales.
Probably to compensate for this, they work every day of the week for almost eleven hours,
from nine in the morning until eight at night. More importantly, as it is testified by the
endless work of negotiation by the street vendor with police and city officials on behalf of
their street vendors, they are constantly afraid of losing their jobs.
On the contrary, street vendors in less accessible areas of the of the city center, the
neighborhoods located in the northern part of downtown Mexico City, sell wholesale to
other street vendors and to low-income people of the city who come to these street markets
attracted by low prices. They are specialized by streets focused on different products.
Some vendors sell electronic, sportswear and play products imported illegally from foreign
countries, others sell footwear and stationery products which, they told me later, they buy
from the many firms located in the small, manufacturing cities around Mexico City. In
addition to being specialized and having low prices, they have quite good working
conditions. The majority of them work approximately eight hours, with one day off,
commonly on Monday. They have large stalls, the size of small one-room store, and easier
access to cheap storage space. The value of these stalls has multiplied during the years.
Finally, it is clear from the permanent common roofs built on top of their stalls and the
leaders' persistent preoccupation with problems related to supply, their main worry is not
about being displaced any time soon. Although it is not clear what the impact is on the
income of every single street vendors working in these markets, it is a fact that their stalls
have increased in value, they have to work less hours, and they trade in goods to which is
easier to apply a consistent mark-up.'
How to explain this paradox? Why do street vendors located in the less accessible
areas of the city center have better economic and working conditions than others with
privileged access to customers? Some recent studies conducted in seven major Latin
American cities seem to suggest that the relationship between location, access to
customers, and street vendors' profits is at least more complex than how is commonly
regarded. Rover (2006) reviewed almost twenty studies focused on street vending in six
major cities -- Bogota, Colombia; Caracas, Venezuela; Lima, Peru; Mexico City, Mexico,
Santiago, Chile; and Sio Paulo, Brazil. She shows street vendors, both within and between
countries, who are "are subject to a clearer and more stable legal framework ... [and that
they] ... have occupied the same space for long time and who have thus established a
regular clientele... have established lucrative enterprises that generate a reasonably stable
income and provide decent working conditions" (Rover, 2006). Other research based on
street vendors in La Paz-El Alto, Bolivia, suggests that "extreme competition in the
overcrowded street commerce, diminishing returns, and disillusionment with traditional
forms of workers' organization hinder cooperation among street vendors" (Agadjanian,
2002). Thus, these studies reveal that other variables related to street vendors' locations
can have an impact on the economic and working conditions of the street vendors. In
particular these variables include: i) street vendors' historical control of location; ii) the
level of economic competition among street vendors - witch is commonly stronger in the
On products like pirates DVDs it is easy to make a consistent profits as the difference between the
consumption value and the production cost tends to be quite high.
most accessible areas where pedestrian traffic is concentrated; iii) the clarity and stability
of the legislation, which often is of a special type in cities' downtown areas.
Based on a comparison of four street vendor groups -- two located in the most
accessible areas and two in less accessible areas of downtown Mexico City -- I will show
that these three variables - all related to use of space, competition for space, and regulation
of space - as well as access to customers and the access to storage affect the economic
outcomes and working conditions of street vendors. As a result, depending on their
location, street vendors develop in different ways and face different obstacles and
opportunities (Figure number 3, page 11).
In particular, street vendors in the most accessible areas, given limited access to
storage space and frequent relocation to which they are forced, specialize in small retail
commerce. In turn, because they work as small retailers, their profits are strongly affected
by their access to customers. This has the result of increasing street vendors' competition
for space. Strong competition for space in an area in which street vending is prohibited but
tolerated creates the conditions that lead to the rise of illegal markets of the most
remunerative locations, counterproductive for street vendors. In fact, because some corrupt
officials grant the most remunerative place to the largest groups -- those who contribute the
most in terms of financial and political support -- the number of street vendors in the most
accessible areas has increased exponentially. 2 The result is that street vendors' have
jeopardized their advantage in terms of privileged access to customers as an increasing
2 The number of street vendors in the most accessible area of downtown went from 6,068, in 1983, to around
60,000, in 2006. Data source INEGI, in "Ambulantaje, cuanto dap or el?" (Hernandez et al, 1993) and El
Imparacial, (05/06/07).
number of vendors have to share the same number of customers, the same limited space for
stalls and the same inadequate access to storage.
Street vendors located in less accessible areas have followed a completely different
path of development. Easy access to storage space and infrequent relocation permitted
these street vendors to expand the scale of their commercial activity. In addition, their
location in less accessible areas and their specialization in wholesale commerce led the
street vendors to focus on price rather than on location. Out of the competition for space
and with stronger control of their area, they managed to expand their network of suppliers
until the point that they come to control a large portion of the Mexican "smuggling
industry." In particular, they specialize in articles of wide consumption like electronics and
sportswear produced in low-wage countries such as China. To the extent that vendors use
part of their profits to keep the police out of their commercial areas, these street vendor
groups cooperated with rather than undercut each other like the vendors located in the most
accessible areas who compete for the exclusive control of the most remunerative sites. In
addition, the large scale commerce in which these street vendors are engaged limit the
number of new street vendors capable of opening a business in these markets. By taking
advantage of the informal distribution system represented by the 500,000 street vendors
working in Mexico City, the street vendors located in the less accessible areas have
increasingly expanded the scale of their commerce and now serve the entire city.
Thus, paradoxically, the experience of street vendors working in downtown Mexico
City shows that the groups of street vendors who ended up enjoying better working
conditions and most likely better returns are exactly those who because they were located
in the least accessible areas of the city center had the ability to specialize in the large-scale
commerce of smuggled products. If the city government will not support street vendors
located in the most accessible areas -- in particular, if it will not act to regulate competition
for space of these street vendor groups -- street trading of smuggled products will remain
the best alternative for Mexico City street vendors.
In the remaining of this thesis I will review the above mentioned elements that
differentiate the street vendor groups located in the most accessible areas from the street
vendor groups located in the less accessible areas of the city center. Underling the marked
differences between these two categories of street vendors, however, should not lead to
draw rushed and too simplistic conclusions. As an example, it is not true that all the street
vendors working in the commercial, central streets are poor and all the vendors in the less
accessible areas are not. For instance, in both cases street vendor leaders accumulated
conspicuous fortunes. More importantly, since between the most and the least contested
areas there is a continuum composed by more or less attractive places, it is impossible to
draw a line of separation between the groups competing for space and those focused on
expanding their businesses. Finally, it must be underlined that many of the variables
related to location affect each other and thus, in certain cases, it is difficult to distinguish
which of these variables is a cause and which is an effect. For instance, it is true that street
vendors who compete on price tend to be less involved in the competition for space. At the
same time, the street vendors who do not compete on space, because in any case would be
relegated in inaccessible and unsafe areas do not have to pay high cost for their locations
and thus tend to have lower prices.
This thesis is organized in the following way. In the next chapter I describe how
street vendors are organized and how the Mexico City administration regulates their
commercial activities in the downtown area. In the third chapter, I review the current
economic and working conditions as well as the opportunities and the constraints that four
groups of street vendors located in different areas of the city center currently face. The
information reported are the result of a four-month filed research which took place during
the summer of 2006 and the month of January 2007. In the fourth chapter, I explain how
the location of street vendor groups affects the scale and the nature of their commerce. In
the fifth chapter I illustrate, on one hand, how the city administration' policy toward street
vending has shaped the competition for space among the street vendor groups working in
the most accessible areas of the city center and, on the other hand, how the other street
vendor groups outside of this competition developed. Finally, in the final chapter I review
how the main findings of this research fit into the literature on informality and which
policy implications we can draw from it for ameliorating the street commerce in downtown
Mexico City.
Figure 1 - location of the four groups of street vendors - Mexico City downtown
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Chapter 2. History of Street Vending in Downtown Mexico City
2.1 Overview of Street Vending in Mexico City
In Mexico City, street vending is one of the most visible and dynamic forms of
commerce. While the street vendors' presence in the city it is far from being a novelty --
prior to the arrival of Spaniards in Mexico, the native Aztecs had markets in public areas --
their number exponentially increased during the second part of the last century. That
increase happened especially after the 1960s, after the end of the "severe repression [of
President Ernesto P. Uruchurtu] and the huge market construction program" which had
made the presence of the street vendors in the entire city "insignificant." In 1998, Cross
(1998b) estimated that in the entire city of Mexico City there were around 200,000 street
vendors (Cross, 1998b). In 2003, the Chamber of Commerce of Mexico claimed that their
numbers reached 500,000.3 Most newspaper articles refer to this estimate.4 This large
increase is commonly explained as a result of the rapid rural-to-urban migration from the
1940s to the 1970s and the economic crisis in the 1980s and 1990s (Roever, 2006).
The city government created a typology that describes the street vendors, that is to
say, those who have a commercial activity in the open air in the streets of Mexico City
(DDF, 1998). It identifies three type of street vendors; those working in mobile markets,
which change location every day of the week, those working in concentrations, which
3 El Imparcial, 05/06/2007
4 La Cronaca is one exception and claims that currently in Mexico City there are 700.000 street vendors,
08/31/2006
operate on a daily bases in a fixed location 365 days a year, and those working in bazaars,
places open only during weekends or holidays in which the vendors have usufructuary
rather than de jure right. All the street vendor groups analyzed in this research are
participants in the concentration street markets.
Every concentration of vendors hosts many street vendor groups; independent
vendors are basically excluded. The strong associationism of the street vendors in Mexico
City has its origins in the city regulation which, in 1951, established that only civil
associations composed by more than 100 street vendors could demand permits or request
to enter into publicly-built markets (Reglamento de Mercados, 1951). Politically, the civil
associations were also obliged to affiliate themselves with the PRI and support political
actions on behalf of that party. Both of these requirements are not valid anymore, but the
majority of the street vendors are organized in civil associations which range in size from a
few dozen to 7,000 members (Cross, 1998a).
Every group is guided by a leader who has strong power over the street vendors he
or she represents. In fact, the leaders decide which street vendor is part of an organization
and which is excluded from it. In addition, when the groups receive a number of sale
licenses inferior to the number of street vendors composing the associations, the leaders
decide how to distribute these licenses.5 Finally, the leaders decide the disposition of the
street vendors in the streets, an element that has a deep impact on the street vendors'
economic result, in particular for street vendors working in the middle-income commercial
5 Officially the city administration has stopped issuing "permanent" sale licenses in 1984. However, it gives
temporary licenses during holiday seasons and at the beginning of the scholastic year. The street vendors told
me that having these temporary licenses allow them to defend their position before a court even in the case in
which they are accused of being vending in a different period of the year. In brief, the leaders who distribute
these temporary licenses conserve a strong power vis-a-vis the street vendors they represent.
streets of the city center. To a certain extent, it is not wrong to say that the leaders select
the street vendors rather than the opposite.
After a survey in six street markets located in Mexico City, Pefia (1999) shows that
street vendors see their organizations, that is to say their leaders, as performing two central
functions (Pefia 1999). The first is an intermediary role: vending organizations negotiate
with the authorities on behalf of individual vendors, so that a primary incentive for joining
an organization is to get help overcoming red tape and navigating bureaucratic procedures
(51% of the street vendors interviewed by Pefia confirmed this). The second is a
managerial role; vending organizations manage conflicts among members and mediate
access to informal markets (29% of the street vendors indicated this option).
The benefits the vendors receive are not without costs. Especially in the past, the
street vendors were asked to join political rallies to support candidates. Even now, if a
vendor does not show up at those rallies, the organization's leader may prohibit the vendor
from working one or more days (Pefia, 1999). In addition the vendors pay daily or weekly
6fees to the organization leader. These fees are used by the leader to give bribes or gifts to
government officials in exchange for tolerance so that vendors can work without problems
(Pefia, 1999).
6 The value of these fees varies depending on the location of the groups. While the vendors in the less
accessible areas of the city center pays almost nothing, the street vendors located in the most accessible areas
pay up to 5 dollars a day, the equivalent of 50% of their profits.
2.2 City Policy Toward Street Vending
The downtown area of Mexico City is a quadrant of less than 6000-foot-side (2
Km), commonly referred as Centro Historico (Figure 1, page 9). The southern part of this
quadrant -- the rectangle with its extremes at The Palacio de Bellas Artes, the Fine Artes
Palace, and the public markets of La Merced -- represents the commercial and tourist area
of the city center. It is the most accessible area since is very well served by the subway
witch has stations every 5 minutes walk. Between the Palace of Bella Artes and the Z6calo,
the main square of the city, there is the so-called financial corridor, where the banks and
other private enterprises together with the city and national government have their offices.
Given the numerous museums and historical buildings located in this area this is also the
most attractive part of the city for tourists. The area located between the Z6calo and the
public markets of La Merced is where commerce is concentrated. There pedestrians tend to
be mostly part of the working class, who go there to do shopping.
The northern part of the city center, on the contrary, is mostly frequented by low-
income people. Many of the buildings of this area are abandoned because they were
damaged by the earthquake and have not yet been repaired. With the exception of the area
near Tepito, the number of pedestrians is very limited. The area is disconnected from the
rest of the city center; crime and bad transportation keep people out of this area. The only
subway line that passes through it does not go south to the city center but west, so that to
go from the southern part to the northern part of the city center it is necessary to transfer.
The downtown area is located across two city districts: Delegacion Cuauhtimoc
and Delegacion Venustiono Carranza. Three of the four groups of vendors analyzed in this
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study are located in the Delegacidn Cuauhtemoc. The other one, though at only 200 feet
(50 meters) from the central district border, is under the administrative jurisdiction of the
other district.
These sub-jurisdictions, however, do not have the responsibility for regulating
street vending in the area of the city center. This task is performed by the Department of
the Federal District, the city government (Cross, 1996), which, from the mid-1980s, has
repeatedly attempted to reduce the number of street vendors. In 1984 the city
administration, to contain the phenomenon of street vending in the city center, stopped
granting new permits to street vendors and tried to relocate the street vendors working in
the most accessible areas of the city center in a large public market called La Merced. That
did not improve the situation however; the number of street vendors doubled in the
following five years (Cross, 1998b). Later, in 1993, a large part of the city center became a
special area in which street vending was banned (Figure 2, page 10) (DDF 1993).7 The city
administration built 38 public markets to give a place to 10.000 street vendors. Yet in
1995, out of the 28 public markets that were constructed at that time, the majority had
more than an 80% vacancy rate; the vendors had returned quickly to work in the streets
(Cross, 1996). During my visit in 2006, most of the street vendor leaders I interviewed
agreed that the only public markets that were fully used were one in Pino Suarez and
another one called Meaves. 8 In 1998, the government tried a similar project on a lower
scale. It reasserted the proebition of the street vendors in the most central part of downtown
7 In reality already in 1967 it was signed an agreement between the street vendors and the city authority that
declared that in the area of the city center street vending was prohibited.
8 Cross 1996 points out that these two public markets, Pino Suarez and Meaves, were both planned long
before this period at the instigation of the vendor organizations themselves, which were far more active in the
design and construction process than other groups
and built 13 public markets, in this case called 'commercial plazas.' The result was that the
street vendors working in the South-West area were forced to move to the Eastern part of
the Centro Historico because the city in the meantime had began the redevelopment of the
western part of the city center. At present, beginning in March 2007 the city government
has attempted to remove from the city center at least 5,000 street vendors. The results of
this last effort are still to be seen (LaJornada, 03/18/2007).
The overall result of this struggle between the city administration and the street
vendors was that the number of street vendors working in downtown Mexico city went
form an insignificant figure, during the Ernesto P. Uruchurtu' presidency, to almost 60,000
(see table 1).9
Table 1 - Number of Street vendors in the area of the city center
1983 1988 1991 1998 2006
City center 6,068 10,368 (in 15,025 -20,000 -50,000
(excluding 12
the area of associations)
Tepito
Teptio Missing 6,231 (in 31 6,288 Missing data -10,000
data associations)
Source Delegation Delegation INEGI Cross, 1998b Interviews
Cuauhtemoc Cuauht6moc quoted in and
quoted in quoted in Hernandez et confirmed
Hernandez et Hernandez et al 1993 by El
al 1993 al 1993 Imparacial,
1 1 05/06/07)
9 The street vendor leaders and the president of the Association of Merchants of the Centro Historico I have
interviewed agreed that at the moment there are about 50.000 street vendors in the central area of the city
center and another 10.000 in Tepito. Newspapers, like El Imparcial confirms this figure (El imparacial,
05/06/07)
Most street vendor leaders I have interviewed identify three distinct phases during
wich the number of street vendors increased. In the 1970s, the people who came to work
downtown as street vendors in many cases had already had an experience in commerce and
located there to have access the wealthy clientele of the city center. During the 1980s, the
economic crises which followed one another brought additional people to work as street
vendors. Most of these new street vendors had not had any previous experience in
commerce. During the 1990s the situation was mixed. Some of the people who came to
work in the city center were street vendors previously working in other areas of the city. In
this case the main cause that led to the increase in the number of vendors was political. The
rise of a new political party controlling the city government, as well as the rising
opposition from the merchants of the city center, led to an increased competition among
street vendor groups who, to augment their bargaining power, increased their membership
(Cross, 1998a).
The change in the street vending system taking place in the city center, however, is
not simply of a quantitative nature. The increasing opposition to street vendors from the
merchants of the city center and from the Mexican Chamber of Commerce is a sign of a
broader change that reflects the change in the nature of the street vending. In the past,
street vendors working in the commercial streets used to buy their supplies from the stores
located in the city center. By the end of the 1980s, however, most street vendors located in
the most accessible areas of the city center bought their supplies from the street located in
the less accessible areas of downtown. During the 1970s, in fact, a large portion of the
street vendors who did not enjoy a favorite access to clients begun importing illegally
products from other countries; quickly they specialized in wholesaling targeted in
particular to other street vendors, including the street vendors located in the most
accessible areas of downtown. In brief, once working mainly as sales agent for the
merchants of the city center, street vendors came to develop a parallel and autonomous
system of commerce. This is one of the most important reasons why in the last two decades
the merchants of the historic center have increasingly denounced street vending as their
major concern.
Clearly, not all groups of vendors benefited in the same way from this process of
commercial 'emancipation.' Simplifying, in fact, street vendors located in the most
accessible locations of the city center merely changed their suppliers from the local
merchants to the street vendors located in the less accessible areas of the city center,
especially those specialized in smuggled goods. On the contrary, the vendors importing
smuggling products increased their clientele and expanded their businesses. In the next
chapter I will explain more in details how these two groups of street vendors managed to
develop in such a different way.
3. Four Groups of Vendors Working in Downtown Mexico City
In this chapter I describe in detail the four groups of street vendors selected for this
study. The data and information provided are the result of field research I conducted in
July and August of 2006 and January 2007. To develop an unbiased understanding of the
way the different groups of street vendors work I used multiple sources of information: the
street vendors, their leaders, city officials, representatives of non-profit organizations
operating around the street markets, and other street vendors both allied and competing
with the groups I was studying.
Given the time constraints and the complexity of developing meaningful
relationships with the groups of vendors, I could not select a sample that statistically
reflected the diversity of the vendors working in the city center. However, I tried to
counterbalance this limitation by selecting the four groups in an independent manner rather
than following a "snowball" method.10 In other words, I came in contact with the four
groups of street vendors in different and independent circumstances: in one case through a
director of a non-profit organization I met at an international conference in Mexico City; in
another case through a city official; and in still another case simply by showing up without
any introduction.
Based on my understanding of the street vending system in downtown Mexico City
the following four examples do not exhaust all the possible typologies of vendors working
10 For a discussion of the different sampling methodologies applied to field research in the informal sector
see Meldolesi and Stame (1998)
in that area. Nonetheless those are representatives of the great majority of them. At the end
of this chapter, in Table 2 (page 34), 1 present a summary of information regarding the four
groups. In Figure 1 (page 10) I report their locations.
3.1 The Z6calo Group
The first group of street vendors I selected for this study is located in the
Corregidora street near the Z6calo, the main square of the city and probably the most
famous landmark of Mexico. The clientele of this group, which I will call "Z6calo" to
preserve their anonymity, is mostly composed of tourists and other middle-income people
either working in the surrounding public and private offices or shopping in the area. The
Pifno Suarez street, one of the most trafficked, commercial streets of the city center start
from that side of Corregidora.
Together with the Z6calo group there are another seven groups of vendors who
work in Corregidora. The Z6calo group is one of the smallest and counts around two
hundred vendors; it has a balanced gender representation, and the average age is about
forty years. Many of them come here after being relocated from the south-west quadrant of
the city center. Most of these street vendors come from the periphery of the city, the so-
called ring of poverty of Mexico City. They work from nine in the morning until eight at
night. Generally each vendor occupies an area of around five square feet (one and a half
square meters) that they delimit with colored sheets on which they lay their products. They
are not specialized on specific products. Some vendors sell CDs and DVDs, others small
electric equipments such as watches, small radios and batteries, and still others hand-made
ethnic shirts and sweaters. Unlike many other vendors of the Centro Historico, they do not
occupy the whole space of the street and place their products only on the sidewalks. Except
for those selling CDs and DVDs, the vendors have almost no inventory with them and on
their sheets they expose a very limited variety of products. Most of them buy their supply
in the low-income street markets of the city center commonly regarded as dangerous,
especially by the middle-class clientele. The leader of the Z6calo group owns a small stall
and with some of his family members ensures that the police do not harass the vendors. He
spends most of his time on the street and claims to be simply a political leader, meaning
that he is not involved in any activity of commercial intermediation between the vendors
and suppliers.
The commercial strategy of the Z6calo vendors is to take advantage of their
privileged location and sell to middle-income customers the goods they buy in the
wholesale, affordable markets located in the less accessible and dangerous areas of the city
center. Their major constrain is their scarce means and possibilities to trade large quantities
of goods, which would allow them to obtain advantageous discounts from their supplies. In
fact, the high risk of having the goods confiscated by the police discourages the vendors
from expanding the scale of their operations- repeatedly the city police has undertaken
demonstrative actions against the vendors located in the most tourist and central areas
(Cross, 1998b). In addition, the limited access to cheap storage places due to the high
demand of land for commercial and business locales around the Z6calo area prevent them
from stocking large quantities of goods.
Along these constraints that impede the Z6calo vendors from expanding their
business, these street vendors face other major problems that threaten their survival in
business. When interviewed, most of them emphasized that the increasing number of street
vendors in the area has decreased their profits. The other problem that only few vendors
revealed, but that other leaders confirmed, was that the vendors of the Zocalo group are
forced to pay very high fees to their leader. Out of their $10 of profits a day, $5 go to the
leaders. This payment is somehow balanced by the fact that, unlike their colleagues in the
low-income and dangerous markets, they do not pay any rent for the places they occupy."I
In conclusion, the Z6calo vendors face strong impediments to expanding or
upgrading their businesses. Their main aim is that of preserving their occupation.
3.2 La Merced Group
These vendors are located in the area of the public markets of La Merced. This area
is at the eastern border of the Centro Historico. Of the four groups of vendors this group is
the only one located outside the perimeter of the Delegacion Cuauhtimoc. Together with
another three groups it occupies the Santa Escuela Street, a small road that separates the
large food markets which the government built during the forties and which until the
eighties functioned as the customs warehouse of the city. While the market attracts mainly
working class people, the very large number of customers visiting the area everyday makes
this place a very privileged and contested site.
" Pena shows that while in Tepito, one of the low-income market, 80% of the vendors rent the places for
their stalls, in other markets this practice is much less common (Pena, 2006).
The group, which I will call La Merced, is composed of about one hundred fifty
vendors; most of the vendors come from the outskirts of the city. In terms of gender there
is parity between men and women; their average age is around forty. They work following
the hours of the public markets: they start at seven in the morning and end at six in the
evening. Unlike the Z6calo vendors, they expose their products in small stalls, rather than
on the ground, and instead of occupying only the sidewalks they take advantage of the
entire space of the street. Most of the La Merced vendors dismantle their stalls at night; for
this reason they are called semi-fixed street vendors. On average, their stalls are about
eight square feet (two and a half square meters), though their size may vary.
In general, the La Merced vendors have always sold products complementary to the
goods traded in the public markets. In the past, there was only one food public market and
the vendors used to sell kitchen utensils, kitchenware and tolls for the cultivation of
flowers and vegetables. Later on, the city built other public markets and the most
successful street vendors moved into them. The empty sites that they left in the street were
quickly taken by other street vendors who previously worked in other areas of the city
center. These new street vendors, together with those who could not afford paying the rent
for a space in the public markets, sold any kind of cheap products, from sweets and
confetti to CDs, DVDs and playthings for kids. Their suppliers are the street vendors
operating in less accessible markets, the wholesalers working in less commercial areas of
the city center, and the same vendors working in the public markets. At the time of my
research, the leader of the La Merced group was in the delegation government most of the
time, making sure that part of her vendors would benefit from the investments allocated to
upgrading the public markets. She told me that while that was an extraordinary period, her
main occupation was that of "staying here," meaning in the city government.
Similarly to the Zdcalo vendors, the commercial strategy of the La Merced's
vendors is to exploit their location, in their case to satisfy the residual and unmet demand
of the many customers visiting the public markets. Unfortunately, the two groups also
share their constraints. In fact, most of the vendors of La Merced have a small space for
their stalls and for their supplies. In addition, they never managed to specialize, which
would have probably helped to increase their visibility and expand their clientele.
Thus, the vendors of La Merced neither have expanded their clientele nor have
specialized on products that yield large margins. Like the Z6calo vendors, their main
objective remains that of surviving and keeping their businesses.
3.3 Tepito Group
This group of vendors is located in Azteca street at the southern entrance of the
market of Tepito, the densest and most organized concentration of street vendors in
Mexico City. The neighborhood of Tepito lays outside the perimeter in which street
vending is banned. In particular, it is located at the northern border of the Centro Historico
and is considered the 'barrio bravo' of downtown Mexico City. With this expression,
Mexicans indicate those neighborhoods famous for housing gangs and criminal groups,
which in most cases are the only effective local, public authority.
The city's police do not enter these neighborhoods. In the case of Tepito, when
public authorities need to arrest suspects or to confiscate stolen or illegal goods they send
the federal police. In most cases, these raids turn into hours of urban war: while some
people attempt to hide themselves and their illegal possessions others slow the police's
entrance into the neighborhood. This is made easier by the physical configuration of the
entire area which is a forced pedestrian zone with stalls fixed to the pavement of most
streets. In addition, the streets are narrow and the houses are the typical Mexican two-floor
houses attached to each other and linked by labyrinthine passages. That makes the entire
neighborhood a very dangerous area for any police officer. To underline these
characteristics some residents of the neighborhood refer to it as the "autonomous republic
of Tepito."
In order to preserve their clientele, the vendors themselves enforce the law,
especially those rules concerning the safety of their customers. In the market areas, petty-
crime such as bag-snatching and petty theft is simply not allowed. This system of self-
policing is made possible by the fact that many of the vendors are from the neighborhood
and, therefore, they know the people involved in these types of activities. That said, no
middle-income person would ever risk entering this area of the city center.
In the 1960s this was a market selling second-hand goods as well as stolen
products. At the beginning of the 1970s, the vendors exploited the lack of policing to sell
illegally-imported, second-hand goods, especially clothing collected in Texas. By the end
of that decade the vendors of Tepito had met some merchants of the Korean community
located in California and begun smuggling electronic and textile products. Now, the main
products traded are footwear, electronic apparatus, pirated DVDs and CDs.
The vendors sell these goods in stalls that look like one-room shops. Usually these
places are forty square feet (twelve square meters), with the goods displayed on the walls
made of metallic fences. On the top of these one-room shops lay common roofs attached to
an iron axis cemented to the floor. In some cases, vendors cover the asphalt in their "one-
room-shop" with ceramic tiles and enlarge the sidewalks thereby using them to distinguish
the floor of their stall from the floor of the street. In brief, the street markets in Tepito lost
the character of an open-air market.
The group of vendors selected for this study, which I will call the Tepito group, has
around two hundred members; most of them are young and male. Almost all of them live
in the neighborhood or somehow know local inhabitants and have worked only in that
specific street market. They commonly work from ten to five and are specialized in
sportswear, in most cases carrying globally famous labels whose authenticity is very
uncertain. Commonly, the vendors buy these goods from their leader who, unlike the
leaders in the other areas of the Centro Historico, spends his time in a small office
organizing the importing activity. While giving a speech to a group of people, the leader of
the Tepito group described his activity as a real CEO of an international corporation. He
claimed that "Tepito [under his and his partners' guide] managed to take advantage of
globalization rather than submit to it." He claimed that because of people like him, Mexico
City is a commercial hub and that his mission was to keep Mexico City the gate linking
Asian production to Latin American countries. Later on, when I came back to meet him, he
was often away at meetings with other local street vendor leaders discussing the
possibilities for forming political and economic alliances.
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One of the major advantages that the Tepito's vendors have is that they dispose of
abundant and cheap storage place. Most people living in the buildings surrounding the
street market offer any available space for storage. In addition, very often at the end of the
day, the street vendors store their goods in the shops next to them, on the streets that they
occupy. This system allows Tepito's vendors to buy large quantities of products, which in
turn makes it convenient to invest in research for cheap and reliable suppliers. For this
reason, street vendors in Tepito are famous in the entire city for providing the lowest prices
and for being able to satisfy any quantity demanded. Not surprisingly, many street vendors
and merchants come from the entire urban areas of Mexico City to stock their supplies in
Tepito.
Thus, even if crime prevents middle-income consumers from entering the market,
by vending to other street vendors and merchants, these vendors have managed to develop
a very large clientele. It is very likely that most of the profits go to the leader, but the
owners of the stalls have certainly benefited from the commercial expansion as the value of
their stalls increased considerably. In addition, the limited hours of work, around seven
hours a day, six days as week, seems to suggest that Tepito's vendors are reaping some of
the economic profits of their leader.
3.4 Santo Domingo Group
These street vendors work near Santo Domingo square, an area between Tepito and
the Z6calo. The Santo Doming group is composed of around one hundred street vendors,
most of them male coming from the city periphery. The area in which they work is at the
northern edge of the perimeter within which street vending is banned. This area is one of
the least inhabited of the Centro Historico. In fact, most of the surrounding buildings were
heavily hit by the earthquake in 1985, and have not been repaired. That gives this area an
abandoned and unsafe look. It is probably for this reason that the commercial activity,
which begins at ten in the morning, stops around five. Unlike Tepito's vendors, the Santo
Domingo peddlers stop working because there are no customers in the streets rather than
simply because the sun is setting.
The partial state of neglect offers Santo Domingo's vendors the possibility of
occupying both the streets and the sidewalks and to install relatively large stalls of around
thirteen square feet (four square meters). These stalls are similar to the one-room shops of
Tepito in that they have walls made of metallic fence where vendors display their products.
However, the market does not have a common roof and at night the vendors have to
dismantle their stalls.
Like the other groups selling in this area, Santo Domingo's street vendors are
specialized in products for children. They sell mainly three types of products: articles for
girls such as bracelets and hair-bands, toys such as dolls and little cars, and any type of
socks for children. Thus, even though street vendors in this area are less concentrated, they
are still part of a specialized market where customers can buy large quantities of goods at a
low price.
The main problem of the Santo Domingo group is related to the frequent burglary
of storage places. The street vendors do not have access to safe places for storing their
goods. As a consequence, most of them have developed some sort of partnership with the
few shops that are in the area, and at night they store their goods in these shops. Unlike
their counterparts in Tepito, these shops enjoy a monopolistic control over storage space.
Thus, not surprisingly, they privilege providing storage space to the street vendors who
buy products from them.
The leader of the Santo Domingo's vendors is the owner of three of these shops.
One of them has a back door leading to a warehouse which occupies the entire three floor
building where the store is located. He explained to me that by centralizing the purchases
of many street vendors he managed to increase the variety of products the street vendors
can sell while still being specialized on specific goods. Obviously, the leader, similar to the
other store owners, is the person who gains the most from these arrangements. However, it
is undeniable that without a certain level of coordination the street vendors would have not
been able to turn their neighborhood market into a specialized market that attracts a large
number of customers even thought it is located in a quite inaccessible area.
In conclusion, the street vendors of Santo Domingo, despite working in an
inaccessible and unattractive location have managed to specialize and expand their
businesses. In comparison to the vendors of Tepito, however, it is likely that the benefits of
this commercial success have only trickled down to the vendors to a limited extent as the
leaders control both the supply and the storage places the street vendors use.
Table 2 - Summary of the information about the four groups of street vendors
Z6calo La Merced Tepito Santo Domingo
Location of Accessible Accessible area Less accessible Less accessible
a the markets area area area
Type of Public Working-class Residential very Mostly
o neighborhood offices and Commercial low-income area abandoned low-
commercial area income area
area
Location vis- Inside the Inside the Outside the At the northern
a-vis the perimeter perimeter perimeter edge of the
banned perimeter
perimeter
Other Tourist and Working-class Only other street Only other street
commercial middle- food public vendors vendors
6 activities in income markets and
o the area commercial other
activities commercial
activities
Most street Many street Stable Never relocatedRelocation & vendors vendors membership
Turnover previously previously (mostly people
working in working in from the Tepito
other areas other areas area)
Type of stalls Removable, Semi-fixed, Fixed Semi-fixed,
Size and stalls 5 sq. ft 8 sq. ft. 40 sq. ft. 13 sq. ft.
0 place On Entire street Entire street Entire street
& occupied sidewalks
Storage Very limited Expensive Abundant and Controlled by
U) cheap leader
Specialization No No, Yes Yes
(yes/no)
Type of DVD & CD, Sweets and Sportswear Toy and beauty
0 product watches, confetti, articles for girls
ethnic DVD & CD,
sweaters Clothing
r Scale of Retailing Retailing Wholesaling Wholesaling
commerce I I I _I
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Source: personal evaluations, summer 2006.
Santo
Z6calo La Merced Tepito SanoDomingo
Suppliers Street markets Street markets In most cases Their leader
in less in less their leader
accessible accessible
areas areas
"! Clientele Middle-class Working and Other street Other street
pedestrians low-class vendors vendors
customers of attracted by attracted by
public low prices low prices
markets
Commercial Sell few Sell few Have law Have low
strategy products at the products at the prices to attract prices to attract
strateg ___highest price highest price customers customers
ow Hours of 9am - 8pm 7am - 6pm 1Oam - 6pm l0am - 5pm
work (Monday
"a closed)Police Very Frequent From time to Almost neverharassment time Never A n
4. Location, Scale of Commerce and Type of Goods
"I do not have that movie.. no, sorry not even that.. look, I have only these
movies you see here, write me down the title and I will have them in a few
days" (street vendor of the Z6calo group selling pirated DVDs)
"In the mid-eighties, I was one of the first to sell walkmans in this city"
(street vendor selling televisions and cameras in Tepito)
4.1 Location and Scale of Commerce: the first street vendors' trade off
Most of the debate about street vending has focused around the issue of location
and use of public space. The most important, almost undisputed assumption that has
framed this debate is that the best option for street vendors is to work in the most
accessible areas where pedestrian traffic is concentrated. Most scholars are convinced that
this is true because empirical studies show that when relocated to less central areas the
same street vendors earn less income (Donovan, 2002). Moreover, the continuously
claimed necessity to work in direct contact with the largest number of pedestrians, as
professed by most street vendor leaders, has persuaded policy makers that indeed central
location and direct occupation of the streets is what street vendors need in order to
maximize their profits.
As already underlined, the meaning of these claims must be judged carefully. One
interpretation could be that street vending is simply not possible in places that are not
commonly frequented by a large number of pedestrians. However, another interpretation is
that street vendors need to be supported to change their organization and their practices as
to adapt to a different clientele. After all, as shown in the cases of the group in Tepito and
in Santo Domingo, street vending can be a lucrative occupation even in less accessible
areas. This suggests that the relation between location, access to customers and street
vendors' profits is at least more complex than is commonly perceived. Indeed, the access
to final customers is not the only factor related to location that concerns street vendors. An
Investigation of these other factors is crucial for understanding how location impacts street
vendors' development.
There are at least six different factors that street vendors consider when thinking
about their location. Three of them push the street vendors to work in the most accessible
areas; the other three encourage the vendors to locate in less accessible streets.
First, location is related to the viability of storage space. Since street vendors have
limited space on their stalls, having a storage space close to their place of work allows
them to sell a larger variety and quantity of goods without incurring the risk of exausting
their supplies. Unfortunately, most street vendors in central areas cannot afford to have
storage places near their stalls because the many commercial and public buildings have left
scarce and expensive space for renting.
Second, location is related to the risk of having the goods confiscated by the police.
The police are more likely to confiscate the goods of the street vendors located in central
locations because these areas are easier to control; they are close to police stations and are
easier to access since they are intersected by large streets. More importantly, the city
administration, at least in the last fifteen years, has tried to renew the central streets of the
city center in part by making it difficult for street vendors to locate there (Cross, 1998a).
Therefore, it is not surprising that the vendors located just next to the Z6calo, the most
central and tourist area of the city, are constantly under threat of police raids. In contrast,
the vendors located in the other area of downtown know that the city administration's
attempt to renovate the city center, at least in the short term, will not involve their areas
and that, therefore, police raids will be rare and more aimed at receiving bribes than
confiscating large quantities of goods.
Third, location affects the type and the size of stalls street vendors can use. Usually,
street vendors prefer large stalls that are fixed to the ground where possible so that they are
not required to assemble and dismantle them everyday. However, only street vendors in
Tepito can use this type of stall. In the central areas, in fact, the city police do not allow the
street vendors to permanently occupy public streets. Thus, street vendors located in central
areas tend to have small stalls, which need to be dismantled at the end of the day.
In brief, unavailability of storage place, the risk of having goods confiscated and
the impossibility of working with large and fixed stalls are all aspects that encourage the
localization of street vendors in places other than the most accessible areas. Clearly, there
are other factors related to location that, on the contrary, persuade street vendors to work in
central areas. Obviously, the most important factor is the privileged access to very large
numbers of pedestrians. Especially when they are middle-income people, who are willing
pay up to three times what is commonly paid for certain products in less accessible, low-
income markets.
The second factor that encourages street vendors to work in the central and busy
streets is that it is easier to manage a stall there. The physical constraints that limit the
quantity of goods and the size and type of stalls that street vendors can use reduce the
upfront and operative costs required to open and run a stall. More importantly, these
constraints level the competition between street vendors so that even vendors with limited
financial resources and little commercial experience have a good chance of keeping their
business. In addition, also because the vendors who inadvertently committed some wrong
investments, like buying difficult-to-sell products, have the possibility to recuperate since
they have can work until late, usually nine at the night. Their counterparts working in less
central areas do not have this option, because the lack of security in their markets
discourages people from going there to do shopping once the day ends, around seven in the
evening.
Along the same lines, street vendors with limited knowledge of suppliers prefer to
work in commercial, central areas. In this case, the vendors simply need to buy goods in
low-income, often dangerous street markets and then resell them to middle-income people
who do not dare to enter into unsafe areas, or to other customers for whom it is not worth
their time to go to the less accessible markets. On the contrary, the street vendors working
in the less central areas need to have privileged contacts with low-cost suppliers, contacts
which are clearly not easy to establish. The clients who shop in the less accessible markets,
in fact, are either intermediaries or final customers who explicitly go there to buy large
quantities of goods at low prices.
Thus, in principle it is not wrong to affirm that there is not a unique best solution in
terms of location for street vendors. Although some factors related to location encourage
street vendors to work in central areas, others make it convenient for them to work in the
less central areas. By looking closely at these two groups of competing factors we can see
a consistent and important difference between them. The qualities of central locations
make it easier for street vendors to open and run small-scale stalls. On the other hand, the
qualities of less central locations make it easier for street vendors to have large stalls and
specialize in medium-to-large scale commerce. We have seen, in fact, that the limited
requirements in terms of knowledge of suppliers, initial financial resources, and experience
in the commercial field make it easy for inexperienced street vendors to start their small
businesses in central locations. On the other hand, the viability of storage space, the limited
risk of having goods confiscated, and the possibility of working with large and fixed stalls
allow street vendors located in the less accessible areas to increase the scale of their
activities.
In the next section I will show that once the street vendors in the less accessible
locations manage to enter into the smuggling industry, the difference in terms of scale of
commerce turns into a difference in terms of products sold and economic organization as
well.
4.2 Smuggling: Additional "Benefit" of being Located in Inaccessible Areas
In the previous section, I illustrated how location relates to the street vendors' scale
of commerce. In this regard, it may appear that the difference between the street vendors
located in the most accessible areas and those located in the less accessible areas of the city
center is simply of a quantitative nature. The experience of the street vendors in downtown
Mexico City, however, shows that this difference may easily become of a qualitative
nature. The street vendors located in the less accessible area of the city center, in fact, can
sell goods that the other street vendors cannot trade. Easy access to storage space and
abundant space for stalls allows the street vendors of Tepito and Santo Domingo to trade in
large types of goods such as used televisions or repaired radios. More importantly, the very
limited control of city police in this area makes it easy for these street vendors to sell stolen
products. In the past, despite being a lucrative business, trading in stolen goods remained a
marginal activity for the street vendors located in the less accessible areas of the city center
because the supply of these products was limited.
However, from the beginning of the 1970s, however, things become to change.
Under the presidency of Luis Echeverria Alvarez (1970 - 1976) the prohibition on
importing products from other countries came to be less and less enforced.' 2 The street
vendors of Tepito were among the first to take advantage of this new situation because
they did not lack courage and had connections with local organizations dedicated to illegal
activities. Throughout the 1970s, the street vendors of Tepito invested an increasing
amount of resources in organizing the smuggling of goods from the United States, initially
used clothes collected in Texas, and later new clothing and electronic products imported by
Koreans in California.
Thus, without major limitations in terms of storage place or police control, the
vendors managed to expand the scale of their operations so as to reduce their average costs
1 Interview with Alfonso Hernandez, the director of the Centro de Estudios Tepitenos,
13 Alfonso Hernandez, the director of the Centro de Estudios Tepitenos - a small and self-financed center of
study of Tepito, affirms that the illegal introduction of clothing began with bags, then it evolved with buses
and finally, by the mid seventies, was a real coordinated activity achieved using proper containers (La
Jornada 03/16/2007). In so doing the street vendors of Tepito had a pioneer function as they were among the
first to invest to expand their network of suppliers to find cheaper, larger and more reliable supplies. Within a
few years, some of these street vendors managed to get the control of the supply chain of used clothes.
and, in turn, the prices for their products. The market of Tepito became the main supplier
for all the street vendors of the entire city who sold clothes. As a result, the street vendors
of Tepito served most of the low and working class of the city either directly, through their
street market, or indirectly, through the decentralized system of distribution represented by
the neighborhood street vendors who stocked up in Tepito.
Using the profits and the know-how acquired while vending used clothes, these
street vendors began to import other foreign products: new clothes and electronic products
imported to Los Angeles, California by Koreans serving as intermediaries. By shifting
products, the street vendors of Tepito further improved their competitive position. Now, in
addition to expanding their control of the supply chain to other products they managed to
gain a unique monopolistic position in the trade of products which simply did not exist at
all in Mexico.' 4 The street vendors in the Santo Domingo groups followed a similar
strategy and specialized in toys and other articles for young girls imported from China.15
What it is important to underline is that the specialization in smuggled products led
the street vendors located in the less accessible area of the city center to "improve" their
business practices and develop a managerial approach. The large supply of products
together with the necessity of selling them quickly required a complete upgrade of the
street vendors' managerial practices. The entire system of street vending developed in a
flexible, specialized and managerially run sector.
" One of the vendors I interviewed in Tepito told me that at beginning of the eighties, for a few years, they
were the only people in Mexico selling walkman, the first generation of portable stereos.
15 Personal communication of Santo Domingo's leader.
From the smugglers at the border to the street vendors in downtown Mexico City,
everyone is interested in specializing in the specific level of the distribution process he or
she controlled. By doing so, in fact, these agents minimize their risk and maximize their
profits. They minimize their risk in that by reselling their products very quickly they were
able to reduce the possibility of being caught by the police with large quantities of
smuggled products. They maximize their profits because their financial resources, instead
of being immobilized in the forms of inventory, could be used to buy increasingly larger
quantities of goods at a diminishing average price (i.e. financial resources could be used to
develop more privileged supply linkages). Thus, the first effect of the switch to imported
products was that of creating a flexible and decentralized system of informal trade,
reassembling in some ways to the model of flexible specialization of the informal small
firms in Northern Italy (Piore, 1984). Indeed, the model followed by the street vendors
seems to go even beyond one of flexible specialization seeing as the illegality factor adds
an extra degree of fragmentation to the supply chain.
The shift to imported goods also increased the incentives for street vendors to
expand the scale of their activity. In fact, the necessity of quickly distributing the smuggled
goods forced the intermediaries and the street vendors to offer strong discounts to those
who could buy large quantities of products. In turn, that increased the street vendors'
incentives to expand their scale of operation and augmented the rewards for a sound
administration of their businesses. In a trade system that strongly privileged the velocity of
the circulation of goods, street vendors needed to have a precise idea of their ability to
commercialize in order to develop strong and lasting relationships with suppliers..
The adoption of the wholesaling practice, in turn, also encouraged cooperation
among street vendors. In some cases, even if not on a continuative basis, street vendors
pool together their financial resources to buy large quantities of goods at low prices. In
other cases they pool their resources. For instance, one vendor would buy more goods than
he or she could afford to sell and give a part of them to another vendor who, on the
contrary, has space on his or her stalls but not sufficient financial resources to stock up
large quantities of goods. Such mechanisms reinforced the flexibility of the entire street
vending system and, at the same time, made it easier for street vendors with very different
skills and resources to manage and expand their business. The level of cooperation among
the street vendors developed even further as the street vendors came to develop an informal
system of property rights (see next chapter).
Finally, it must be acknowledged, however, that not all the street vendors enjoy the
same level of involvement in the importing business. The "industry" of unregulated trade
is very diverse. During my field research in Tepito, I interviewed street vendors who fly to
China to buy products they directly sell in the market who work alongside street vendors
who estimated in about ten the number of intermediaries above them. However, even the
street vendors involved merely in the distributions of foreign products have been pushed to
adopt the above mentioned practices and managerial arrangements.
In conclusion, starting from the beginning of the 1970s, the street vendors located
in the less accessible areas of the city center managed to turn their obstacles into an
opportunity. The location in a low-income neighborhood allowed the vendors to rent
storage places for little money. The fact that they were located outside the central and
tourist area of the city center along with the criminal activity taking place in the
neighborhood kept the police outside of the market and allowed for specialization in
smuggled products. Once the vendors managed to expand the scale of their businesses so
as to have the lowest prices of the city, their limited access to customers was no longer a
problem: the street vendors located in the less accessible areas of the city center sold in
wholesale to the other street vendors of the city who would then distribute their goods
across the entire city.
5. Location, Competition for Space, and Street Vendors' Economic Organization
"I do not know how to go back to my street vendors and tell them that the
10,000 dollars that we gave to a city administrator to keep the control of
our site of vending are simply lost; someone in the city government has
probably received a better offer and for this reason now we are obliged to
relocate"(Leader of a group of street vendors located near La Merced)
"Oh, those shirts there are not mine; I am selling it for my leader to pay
him for a credit he gave me when I got married" (Eusevio, street vendor
of the Tepito group).
5.1 Competition for Space in the Most Accessible Downtown Areas
As the description of the two groups near the Z6calo and near the public markets of
La Merced reveals, the main strategy of the vendors working in the most accessible streets
of downtown Mexico City is to sell their few products at the highest price. In fact, the
limitation in the quantity of goods the street vendors can show in their small stalls and the
lack of sufficient storage place constraints the amount of goods the vendors can sell on any
given day. For this reason, the street vendors located in the most accessible areas focus on
a strategy that could be called intensive vending: selling a limited number of goods at the
highest price.
1 6980 .- ON s..- H.m M,
This objective makes it necessary to reach middle-class customers or, more
generally, those customers who are willing to spend some extra pesos in order to have their
needs satisfied right away. In fact, the low class, which in Mexico City represents the
majority of the population, pays close attention to their expenses and would not buy
something that is sold at a lower price in a nearby street market. On the contrary, working
and middle- class people are less worried about spending some extra pesos in exchange for
having what they want in a convenient location. Furthermore, for a large portion of these
customers, especially the most well-off, low-income markets are simply not an option as
they are seriously scared of the safety conditions of these bazaars.
Thus, the objective of the street vendors working in the city center, contrary to
what is commonly assumed is not simply to access the largest number of clients, whoever
they are, but rather to sell to well-off clients passing by in the streets of downtown Mexico
City. Consistently with that objective, the street vendors working in the central areas spend
time and financial resources dealing with city administrators and police officials in order to
retain their locations.
The problem with this strategy, however, arises from the fact that there are few
locations that provide access to these riche customers. Typically, these areas are the
commercial areas located in the most accessible streets of the city center, sites that the city
administration would like to see without street vendors. As Cross (1998) shows, street
vendors have managed to retain control of these locations by leveraging the fragmentation
of the city government apparatus. When some government officials decide that street
vendors must leave these sites, other city officials, often in exchange for political and
financial support, back their cause (Cross, 1998b).
However, this very same system of opaque negotiation16 has pushed the street
vendor groups to enter into an endless and all consuming competition for space that
impedes the street vendors from upgrading their businesses and to improve their
managerial practices and that keeps their profits artificially low. Clearly, the result of these
effects is to reinforce the street vendor competition for space.
The street vendors located in the most accessible locations use most of their
resources to gain the political support necessary to occupy the most remunerative sites.
City officials, in fact, grant the best sites to the street vendor groups who provide the
strongest financial and political support. The street vendors of La Merced and Z6calo pay
their leaders fees that reach a significant portion of their profits, in most cases between
one-third and one-half of their profits. 17 These fees are at least twice as much as what their
counterparts in the less central sites usually pay. 1
What is worse, however, is that these bribes do not guarantee that the vendor
groups will obtain what they pay for. It is not infrequent, in fact, that a group of vendors
gets relocated by the police despite paying a government official to occupy one portion of
16 In 1967, it was established for the first time that street vending was forbidden in the area of downtown
Mexico City. In 1993, and later in 1998, the city approved two new programs promoting the reordering of the
commercial activity in downtown Mexico City in which practically the same prohibition is reiterated. Yet,
the city government issued permanent permits to the street vendors until 1984 and thereafter the city has
issued temporary permits. In any case, city officials have continued to negotiate and distribute access to the
best locations even though the number of street vendors in downtown went from 6,068, in 1983, to around
60,000, in 2006. Data source INEGI, in "Ambulantaje, cuanto dap or el?" (Hernandez et al, 1993) and El
Imparacial, (05/06/07).
7El Imparcial, 05/06/07 reports that many vendors pay about five dollars every day to their leaders for the
use of public space. "Importantes dirigentes ya dividi6 el Centro Hist6rico practicamente en dominios
feudales, cobrando un alquiler de aproximadamente cinco d6lares al dia por el uso de espacio en las calles y
aceras." The same number is confirmed by journalists writing in LaJornada 03/19/2007)
181 received this data from the leader of the Santiago Group and it has been confirmed by another leader
working outside the city center, a leader who I do not have reason to doubt since he has very limited vested
interests in defending or supporting this or that group working downtown. It must be acknowledged,
however, that while the vendors working in the most trafficked areas do not pay the rent for the space they
occupy some of the vendors working in less central areas, like those in Tepito, very often pay a rent for their
stalls. My understanding is that this rent is around 10% to 20% of the street vendors' profits
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the streets. In most cases this happens because police receive a better offer from another
group of vendors. Clearly, the vendors who paid the city official in the first place do not
receive any compensation for this damage. 19
The other possible way for the street vendor groups to increase their chances of
accessing the best sites is to augment their numbers. In fact, the greater the number of
street vendors working in a group, the larger the number of votes that that group will be
able to mobilize. In addition, the greater the number of street vendors, the higher the total
amount of the per-person fees that the leaders can use to bribe city officials in order to
obtain the control of the best sites. However, at an aggregate level this strategy is
detrimental for the street vendors. The increasing number of street vendors, in fact, results
in the decrease of the sales for the individual street vendors. This problem is particularly
acute for the groups of vendors who are not specialized on specific products as the larger
number of street vendors it is not even partially compensated by a stronger visibility and
attractiveness of the street markets. In addition, a larger number of street vendors translate
into more difficult access to storage and less space for stalls. Yet, even in this case street
vendor groups could not resist the competition for space. In 1983, there were 6,068 street
vendors in the most central area of downtown Mexico City. In 1991, their numbers
increased to 15,520 street vendors.2 0 Current estimates say that in the same area there are
now between 50,000 and 60,000 street vendors.
19While waiting to interview a public official in the offices of the Delegaci6n Venustiono Carranza, I met a
leader who was desperate as she did not know how to justify to the vendors she represented that the 2000
dollars they gave to a public official had been simply wasted. She explained to me that the police removed
them from a street next to one of the market of La Merced because another group of vendors had made a
larger offer.
20 Source of data INEGI (Mexican National Institute of Statistics), in "A mbulantaje, cuanto dap or el?"
Hernandez Hernandez Alfonso, Sanchez Garcia Ma. Del Carmen, Villafan Caro Martha Beatriz, Mortera
Gutierrez Juan Antonio, Lopez Mejia Rodolfo, Instituto Nacional de Administraci6n Publica. 1993.
The competition for space has also other more indirect effects on street vendors.
For instance, it reduces the street vendors' possibility of upgrading their businesses. The
frequent reshuffling of the vendors, in fact, discourages them from investing even their
limited resources in their businesses because their sales are hard to predict. In addition,
their relocation impedes the street vendors from developing a loyal clientele and, more
generally from distinguishing themselves as being part of a specific market. This, in turn,
makes it difficult for them to specialize and, more generally, to incrementally upgrade their
businesses and their managerial practices. Finally, the competition for space impedes the
street vendors from switching to trading more profitable products. In an attempt to gain
political support from the businesses association of the city center and the city
administration, some vendor groups refrained from selling the most controversial products
like pirated DVDs and sportswear.2 1 In so doing, however, they neither accessed the large
profits that these products usually yield nor were they induced to expand and upgrade their
network of suppliers.
It is important to notice that the competition among street vendor groups does not
diminish but augments when the city administration is inclined toward tolerating the street
vendors' occupation of the commercial central streets. In fact, when the city administration
seems to tolerate street vending, the number of authorities who have room to 'authorize'
street vendors to occupy privileged locations augments. This has the effect of increasing
the level of competition among groups of vendors as each authority has its "favorite"
group of vendors to support. Moreover, newly elected city administrations that tolerate
street vending will still tend to support the vendor groups that are more loyal to them rather
2Recently, some groups leaders working in the city center have publicly announced that they would not
allow their vendors to sell pirate products like CDs and DVDs.
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than those controlling the best sites during the former administrations. Once again, the
result will be an increasing number of groups competing for the control of the most
valuable spots of the city center.2 2
In conclusion, the street vendors in the most accessible locations are trapped in a
vicious cycle. Their location constrains the scale of their commerce and as a consequence
their only available commercial strategy is to gain access to well-off clients. In attempting
to reach this clientele, however, they enter into a competition for space that reduces their
profits, increase their difficulties in accessing storage, limits the size of their stalls and
impedes them from selling more lucrative types of goods. The effect of these constraints is
to increase the street vendors' dependency on a well-off clientele, that is to say, to increase
their competition for space.
5.2 Cooperation Among and Between Street Vendor Groups
5.2.1 Cooperation for Impunity Among Groups
As already underlined, the main objective for street vendors working in the less
central streets of the city center is to have access to cheap, large-scale and reliable
intermediaries, or, even better, intermediaries specialized in smuggling. Outside of the
2Every vendor or leader interviewed complained that during the last administration the PRD has formed a
new set of vendor groups which has increased the fragmentation and the competition among street vendors.
The newspaper La Cronaca citing a study undertaken by Castillo Bertier, a researcher at the main university
of Mexico City (UNAM), says that with the election of the PRD party to the city government, the number of
organizations of street vendors went form 13, in 2000, to 200, in 2006.
most accessible areas of the city center, in fact, the only means of attracting clients to their
locations is to have very low prices. This is the reason why the street vendor groups
located in the less accessible areas of the city center do not compete for space; their main
objective is to have low-cost suppliers not to be closer, for instance, to the street markets'
entrances. Clearly the most low-cost suppliers are those involved in the smuggling
industry.
As shown in the previous chapter, one of the reasons explaining why they managed
to enter the smuggling is that they are located in the less accessible mostly low-income
areas of the city center where criminal organizations, and not the police, tend to have the
control of the territory. However, the street vendors' illegal activity would not have lasted
had not the street vendor groups had the complicity of police and other city administrators.
It is common knowledge that the street leaders of Tepito use a portion of the profits to
corrupt high level city and police officers to prevent any obstacles to the smooth
functioning of the business in Tepito. In so doing, however, the groups do not undercut
each other like the street vendors working in the most accessible areas of the city center.
The street vendors in the most accessible areas, in fact, demand of city officials that they
have the exclusive access to remunerative locations.23 On the contrary, the groups in
Tepito, and similarly the groups in the less accessible areas, demand a "non rival good:"
having police out of their neighborhood benefits all the street vendors located in the
neighborhood, even if they are part of different groups. 24t is worth looking at the
23 Excusive refers to the fact that when one group of street vendor occupies one sites the other street vendors
cannot stay in the same space.
24 A good in non-rivalrous when the consumption of this good by one individual, in this case one group of
street vendors, does not reduce the amount of the good available for consumption by others
experience of the street vendors of Santo Domingo to explain this affirmation in more
details.
A former worker for an airline company, the leader of the Santo Domingo group
used his financial resources and contacts to began importing products produced in Korea
and then, from the beginning of the 1990s, produced in China. He used his profits to rent a
store functioning as a warehouse. He sold most of his goods to his street vendors who, not
having other places to keep their products, used his warehouse as storage. When his
commercial activity came to be too visible he bought a license as a merchant, yet he kept
selling only to street vendors. The commercial licenses, he told me, represented merely a
'gift' he had to give to some city administrators. In the following years, he bought other
two commercial licenses, one for his son and another for his sisters. On each occasion he
had to bribe some city officials. In exchange for these bribes, he obtained the police
staying out of the streets surrounding his shops. The result is that all the vendors located in
these streets, independently of the groups they belong to, are ensured that they will not
have to face the police and as a result they can trade in smuggled goods without fear.
In conclusion, what distinguishes the groups of street vendors located in the less
accessible areas of the city center from those located in the most central areas is the fact
that rather than competing for space they supported each other in obtaining impunity for
their commercial activity.
5.2.2 Cooperation Within Groups
One of the reasons why the street vendor leaders are called 'natural leaders,' is that
there are not public rules or administrative regulations that discipline the selection of the
leaderships within the associations of street vendors. Indeed, the adjective 'natural'
underlines the fact that the leaderships position are the result of selection "on the ground;"
who becomes a leader is someone who has demonstrated capacity to solve collective
problems. Clearly, in the case of street vendors working in the most accessible streets, the
leaders will be those who have shown a capacity in negotiating with public authorities for
the ability to occupy a privileged location. In the case of the street vendors located in the
less central areas of the city center, in contrast, the leaders will be those who can provide
contacts with privileged suppliers. Indeed, many of the street vendors I interviewed in
Tepito and in Santo Domingo buy their products from their leaders who function as
middlemen. It is important to notice that the same it is not true in the case of the street
vendors located in the most accessible areas of the city center. Their leaders, in fact, think
that it is not worth doing good intermediation because without storage space and large
stalls the street vendors would always face major constraints to their commercial
expansion. In addition, unlike the leaders in the less accessible areas of the city center, they
know that their street vendors would have major problems trading in smuggled goods, i.e.
the really lucrative commerce for which it would be worth trying to overcome the obstacles
25
related to the limitations of space.
25 Interview with the leader of the Z6calo group
Hence, the leaders of the street vendors working in the less accessible areas, unlike
their counterparts operating in the commercial streets, have a deep stake in the street
vendor business expansion. The greater the total sales of the street vendors, the larger the
profits that the leaders gain from their activity of intermediation. Thus, it is not surprising
that the street vendor leaders operating in the less accessible areas of the city center not
only use their connections to suppliers but also the power they have as leaders to promote
the street vendors development. The way the street vendor leaders promoted the
specialization of the street vendors is probably the best example of how these leaders use
their authority to promote the street vendors' commercial expansion.
The street vendor leaders, as most large-scale merchants, tend to be specialized in
few products. While doing their businesses, in fact, they acquire knowledge and develop
networks related to specific supply chains. In addition, given the large discounts that they
obtain buying large quantities of products they will tend to focus their resources on few
suppliers, which in most cases are specialized in few products. Thus, the leaders of the
groups of vendors located in the less central locations of the city center have an interest in
promoting the specialization of their street vendors in these specific products. is beneficial
to the street vendors This in the medium-long term because the street markets in which
they work it distinguishes from the others and attracts more customers. However,
commonly street vendors of the same group tend to avoid selling the same products.
Indeed, one of the reasons that led to the establishment of street vendor leaders is that there
is the need for somebody who can solve disputes among street vendors who want to sell
the same products (Pefia, 1999).
The leaders of the vendor of Tepito and Santo Domingo, however, have pushed
their vendors to trade in similar goods. They were able to do so by using their commercial
power. The leaders, in fact provided their street vendors with products of the same
category but of different models. For instance, in one group specialized in selling writing
materials, near Tepito, some vendors sell notebooks for offices with a particular color and
form, others sell notebooks of smaller dimension with pictures on the cover for elementary
students, etc. However, it is hard to imagine that this could have happened had the leaders
not also had the power to reward and sanction the street vendors.
Another sign that reveals how street vendor leader use their power directly to the
advantage of their street vendors is their work of limitation of the number of street vendors
working in the less accessible street markets. As an example, in 1991, in the entire area of
Tepito there were 6,288 street vendors. Currently, most accounts say that there are around
10,000 street vendors in Tepito. Thus, while in the most central areas of the city center the
number of street vendors multiplied by four or five, in Tepito it doubled at most. There is
not doubt that this has happened because the leaders of Tepito wanted it to be so. They are,
in fact, the only people responsible for deciding the number of street vendors who are part
of their groups. Very likely the reason why they limited the number of street vendors is
that as wholesalers they prefer to trade in large quantities with a limited number of street
vendors rather than with many street vendors, selling each a small amount of goods. In any
case, the result has been that the street vendors have been protected by their leaders from
the competition of the other vendors and, as a result, they did not face constraints to their
business expansion.
Finally, the leaders used their power to support the establishment of an informal
system of property rights which allowed the street vendors to access credit and to
accumulate consistent assets. Street vendors, especially in the past, did not have sufficient
financial resources to buy large quantities of supplies. Once the leaders came to have large
amounts of goods available, they began supplying goods on trust using the street vendors'
spots as collaterals in order to speed up commercialization. Currently in Tepito, for
instance, around 90% of the stalls are either owned or rented (Pefia, 1999). The street
vendors who I interviewed told me that their 40 square foot stalls can cost up to 10,000
dollars. To estimate the real value of this amount of money it is sufficient to say that that is
equivalent to what a Mexican employee earning minimum wage makes in 6 years. To give
a sense of the sophistication of this system of property rights as well as the central role that
the leaders play in it, it is worth saying that for any stall transaction the street vendor
leaders receive a levy equivalent to 10% of its value.
With time the street vendors began asking their leaders for credit for the purchases
of goods other than the products they sell, for instance for financing the expenses of their
marriage.26 In many cases these agreements contain a mix of in kind and monetary
transactions. For instance, the street vendors who borrowed from their leaders sell their
goods together with those of the leaders instead of paying interests and give them the
correspondent profits. Once again, the power that the leaders have vis-h-vis the street
vendors made possible the establishment and the functioning of a mechanism that helps the
development and the business expansion of the street vendors.
26 This is the experience of one street vendor in Tepito. In his interview he told me that his case was not an
isolated one.
6. Findings and Policy Implications
"However useful 'sectors' may be in coming to terms with a national
economy and drawing up broad programs for investment, it is important to
understand they are empirical, not theoretical categories: they are
arbitrarily defined chunks of this or that economy, managerial devices.
Their use as comparative analytical categories can only be an imposture. .
(Robertson, 1984)
". . the SF [small firms] literature is strangely silent on the politics in which
SF support is so firmly embedded" (Tendler, 2002)
This work started with one question: why street vendors located in the less
accessible areas of the city center have better economic and working conditions than others
with privileged access to customers. This is a central question because the answer helps not
only to design better relocation programs or regulations disciplining street vending, but
also to understand what distinguishes the street vendors and why in a commonly assumed
unregulated and very competitive sector composed by small enterprises and similarly
educated workers there is such strong heterogeneity. Most mainstream theories, in fact, do
not lend themselves to interpret differences existing in the informal economy, as they are
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developed around a notion of "modem" economy described in terms of technologies,
sectors, human capital, etc. 27
6.1 Confronting the Evidence with the Literature on the Informal Economy
Based on a comparison of four street vendor groups -- two located in the central,
commercial areas and two in the less trafficked, internal streets of the city center -- this
study shows that street vendors working in Mexico City downtown are stratified. The
cause of this stratification is related to the different locations of the street vendor groups.
Location, in fact, affects the scale and the kind of commerce street vendors can develop,
determines the level of street vendors' competition for space and affects street vendors'
possibility to develop appropriate economic institutions and other arrangements that
support their economic development. As a result, depending on their location, street
vendors develop differently and face different obstacles and opportunities. This divergent
development keeps the street vendors segmented in two different types of street markets
that are so different from each other that it is difficult for street vendors to move from one
type to the other. The street vendors located in the most accessible locations, in fact, do not
have the skills, the organizational capacity, the financial resources and the required
connections with suppliers to compete with the street vendors located in the less accessible
areas. In addition, the street vendors located in the most accessible areas find it difficult to
2 Most economic models predict that these types of firms in this type of 'sector' would show very similar
outcomes. Without market-specific skills, immobilized resources, and restrictive legislations the street
vendors should have no reason not to move from the less to the more remunerative street markets.
move to other street markets as the leaders working in these other markets oppose their
entrance.
The first striking conclusion of this analysis is that it contradicts an interpretation
that describes street vending as possible only in locations where there is heavy pedestrian
traffic. The experience of the street vendors located in downtown Mexico City shows that
access to customers is only one of the factors that the influence street vendors' economic
outcomes and working conditions. Space for storage and competition for space influence
the street vendors' development in such a way that street vendors in less accessible areas
can develop, and expand their businesses, and become small wholesalers so as to offset
their disadvantages in terms of limited access to clients.
Thus, the second conclusion drawn from this study is that there is no single
typology to define street vendors in downtown Mexico City. Indeed, the street vendors
working in the city center can be divided into at least two groups: one composed of street
vendors engaged in very low-scale commerce in a endless competition; and another group
composed of street vendors involved in medium-to-large scale commerce with privileged
access to lucrative products. The first striking characteristic of this stratification of the
street vendors is that it contradicts all interpretations describing the workers of the informal
sector as either "refugees" lacking formal jobs (Hart 1971; Desoto, 1989; Portes 1984) or
voluntary participants seeking to avoid paying the price of legal compliance (Maloney
2004).28 The analysis of the street vendors working in downtown Mexico City shows that
28 The definition of the informal economy has evolved during the times. At the beginning it was defined as
the sum of the economic activities taking place in small firms with little capital, in sector with little barrier of
entry where formal regulations of the state could be easily avoided. Thus, it was believed that the cause of
informality was the existence of a large population of poor who did not have the assets to enter the formal
economy (Hart 1971). In the eighties the informal economy scholars began to question and investigate the
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in the so-called informal sector there are both types of workers. The second surprising
feature about this duality within the informal sector 29 is that it resembles the duality within
the formal economic (Berger and Piore, 1980): on one extreme, firms that due to their
larger seize and their collusive behavior are able to conserve their competitive advantage
vis-a-vis their potential competitors; and on the other extreme, a large number of small
firms in fierce competition for a niche market. In the case of the street vendors, however,
the determinant of the economic polarization is caused by their different location rather
than by the different mode of production or the distinct characteristics of the economic
sectors in which they compete.
This leads us to a third conclusion: exemption from legal compliance as well as the
political economy that develops around these initiatives has a deep impact on the
development of micro-enterprises like those of street vendors. In the last fifteen years the
literature on small business development has extensively debated the necessity to grant
informal firms the possibility to avoid compliance with fiscal and labor standards as a
means to support their development (DeSoto, 1989; Djankov et al. 2002). The comparison
causes of informality. The scholars who analyzed the self employed and the small firms related to the
construction sector argued that informality was caused by excessive legislation which discouraged, if not
impeded completely, the participation of the poor in the informal economy (Desoto, 1989). Others
researchers by looking mainly at disguised wage employed thought that the main driver of informality was
exactly the opposite: the weakening of the formal legislation (Portes et all, 1989). Despite the different
explanations that these researchers gave to informality they agreed on the point that the workers engaged in
this economy were fundamentally the poor who did so because they had limited access to the formal
economy. With the rice of informality that took place in both developing and in developed countries in the
last decades (World Bank, 2005), a new explanation for the existence of the informal sector has emerged.
Those that support this new interpretation have focused their research on the small business owners,
especially male, and have argue that rather than being dictated by a lack of personal assets, informality is
'preferred' to formal employments because it allows to avoid complying with legal and fiscal legislations
(Maloney, 2004). This explanation assumes that those who enter the informal economy are voluntarily doing
So.
29 It is important to remember that Informal self-employment in Latin America constitutes the largest source
of employment among men after formal salaried employment, in some cases exceeding 40% of the work
force (Maloney 2004).
between the street vendors in downtown Mexico City confirms the thesis put forward by
Tendler (2002), who underlines the distinction between two types of exemptions: those
unconditioned and 'universalist,' which discourage firms' development; and those aimed at
increasing the rewards for enterprises that decide to grow, which encourage business
expansion. The case of the street vendors, in fact, letting aside the pernicious effects of
smuggling, shows that those who have been exempt from complying with the rules
disciplining the use of public space, base their competitiveness purely on the privileges
that this exemption provides them (i.e., access to customers) and as a result stay small.
Paradoxically, the seemingly less 'active support' that the other street vendors receive (i.e.,
impunity for their expansion and later for entering in the smuggling industry) had the
opposite effect: it increased the rewards for those willing to expand the scope of their
businesses.
However, the comparison of the street vendors in downtown Mexico City shows
that there is a second, and probably even more important, reason to avoid unconditioned
exemption which has to do with the political economy that develops around these
initiatives. When this support is rationed, in the sense that is granted only to one group of
firms, still without regard to their ability to compete, enterprises may enter in competition
for obtaining the exemption rather than for expanding their businesses. That, especially in
contexts characterized by phenomena of corruption, has the effect triggering an
unregulated competition which not only discourages firms from developing but also mines
their very capabilities to grow. One of the mechanisms by witch this may happen is
through the weakening and the spoiling of the correct functioning of small firms
associations.3 0
This leads us to the forth conclusion. Mexico city street vendors throughout the
years have developed associations which in turn have created economic institutions and
rule of conducts that strongly affect their economic decisions. There is an ample literature
that discusses street vendor organizations. 31 However, almost all studies focus on the
sociological and political implications of the existence of these collective actors; no study
that I read explicitly focuses on the economic implications of these organizations. Yet
these organizations have a very strong impact on the street vendors' economy. In addition,
most likely these organizations will filter any type of policy intervention based merely on
monetary incentives. Policies of this type are often advocated for informal, small firms'
development on the assumption that small-scale economic actors in strong competition
with each other and in an almost completely unregulated sector are perfectly sensitive to
price variations (Maloney, 2004). This comparison, however, suggests that the category of
agents probably most commonly regarded as being highly sensitive to price variations, the
street vendors, actually face important barriers of an institutional nature.
This suggests that institutional reforms and regulations disciplining in particular the
functioning of small businesses associations have a central role and should be regarded as
policy instruments as important as those impacting directly on price signals.
30 There is an extended literature that focuses on the connection between (lack of) economic development,
untargeted economic support and corruption, thought despite very distinguished exception -- Berger (1981),
Tendler (2002), Criscuolo (2002) -- it has focused on large firms (Biddle, J.& Vedat M. (1997)). Given the
critical role that legislation and the enforcement of it, on one hand, and associationism of small firms, on the
other, plays on small enterprises, this bias is not justified
31For example see Cross (1998) Bromley (1978), De Soto (1989), McGee (1973) Sanyal (1992) and Escobar
Latapi (1990).
Finally, this study shows that the distinction between the informal sector and the
illegal sector is less neat than how it may be represented by a legalistic definition. Castell
and Portes define the activities in the informal sector as those that encompasses income-
earning activities that are not regulated by the state in social environments where similar
activities are regulated "(Castells and Portes, 1989). This definition would make the street
vendors involved in the smuggling business seem as standard workers engaged in the
informal sector. However, it is clear that the high profits that some of the vendors involved
in the smuggling industry make are a direct result of the fact that that activity is very risky,
and accessible only to a restricted number of people. Risks and accessibility should be
regarded as important categories to analyze when assessing "border line" economic
activities within the informal sector.
6.2 policy Recommendations
From these conclusions it is possible to draw some policy recommendations aimed
at improving the conditions of the street vendors working in downtown Mexico City, in
particular those located in the central commercial streets. Given the complexity of the
stakeholders' interests, these recommendations should be taken as an illustration of
potentially positive initiatives rather than as a list of "all inclusive" interventions. However
it is important to underline that if the city government will not support street vendors
located in the most accessible areas -- in particular, if it will not act to regulate competition
for space of these street vendor groups -- street trading of smuggled products will remain
the best alternative for Mexico City street vendors.
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Firstly, there is not a single approach that can be followed to support the
development and the formalization of all street vendors at the same time; indeed, it is very
likely that an initiative supporting one type of street vendors if applied to another type
could have detrimental results. It is better to design specific initiatives aimed at either
making the competition for space of the street vendors engaged in survival activities
transparent, or supporting the development of deeper linkages between Mexican producers
and the vendors involved in large scale commerce.3 2 These initiatives would contribute not
only to improve the street vendors' economic conditions but also to undermine the
expanding power of illegal organizations that somehow are involved and benefit from the
street vending activity.
Secondly, the city administration should stop granting in an unregulated and no-
transparent manner the permission to work in the main streets of downtown Mexico City.
The actual perimeter of the downtown area in which street vending is not allowed should
reflect the real possibilities for and will of the city administration to enforce such a
prohibition. Outside of this perimeter, street vending areas should be assigned on a
multiyear basis following a transparent system of bidding.
Thirdly, policies and initiatives should be designed based on a notion that
recognizes that street vendors, even in economic terms, act in groups. For this reason there
32In supporting the establishment of an organization linking the vendors to national producers it is
recommended to encourage an organization with a high degree of autonomy from the public authority and
whose financing is progressively related to the vendors' economic results, for instance by linking it to the
cost paid by the vendors to rent public space. These characteristics will ensure that the organizations at the
beginning will find flexible solutions reflecting the concrete possibilities of the vendors and later on that will
increasingly favoring the development and the formalization of the street vendors. For more on successful
provider of services to small informal firms read Criscuolo (2002)
are no policies or relocation programs that can be successful without being accompanied
with reforms aiming at redesigning the institutions street vendors have developed.
For instance, it is important to change the mechanisms guiding the access to the
leadership of the street vendor organizations. As the street vendors in the less central areas
of the city center show, for street vendors' development the leadership should be open to
those who are more equipped to reap the opportunities that the markets provide. Such a
reform would have the additional benefit of increasing the transparency and the democracy
of the leadership selection. While a positive objective in itself, achieving this goal would
increase the possibility that economic benefits will trickle down from the leaders to the
street vendors. This objective could be accomplished by attributing directly to the single
street vendors the sale licenses. Currently, the leaders receive the licenses from the city
administration and in distributing them reward their supporters and penalize their
challengers. Even if the city administration stops issuing these licenses, this reform is
needed as in the absence of a transparent system that gives autonomy to the vendors the
leaders will keep exercise their power.33
Similarly, in supporting the unsuccessful street vendors, a particular attention
should be devoted to the street vendor leaders whose interests must be realigned with the
economic success of the individual street vendors they represent; currently the economic
interests of the street vendor leaders is related to the per-head fees that street vendors pay
to them, hence to their number more than their economic success. Changing this structure
of incentives for leaders would contribute to facilitate street vendor upgrading and to
reduce the number of street vendors working in the city center.
3 See Thulare (2005) for a description of how administrative arrangements' effects survive to regulation
(2005)
Lastly, in designing policies supporting the street vendors engaged in survival
activities, policy makers need to balance the objectives of supporting the most capable
vendors to upgrade and move into more remunerative markets, with those of limiting the
depletion of the organizational capacity of these vendors groups. As shown street vendors'
success is very much related to their collective capacity.
- - -- ----- W*fWANW
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